The Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, Prak Sokhonn, also Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, paid a visit to Myanmar, in his capacity of Special Envoy, from March 21 to March 23, 2022. The ASEAN high dignitary met the head of the Myanmar military junta, General Min Aung Hlaing; the two leaders discussed “the situation of protests and violence stemming from political disagreement”, humanitarian cooperation as well as the implementation of the ASEAN-initiated “Five-point Consensus”.
The “Five-point Consensus” reached on April 24, 2021 between ASEAN and the head of the Myanmar military junta, General Min Aung Hlaing, envisaged ending the violence in Myanmar, creating a dialogue constructive between all parties, appointing of an ASEAN Special Envoy to facilitate national dialogue, the acceptance of aid and a visit of the Special Envoy to Myanmar. To date, the Association, made up of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, has excluded military government officials from its meetings, which has been interpreted by some in the light of the non-compliance of the military junta with the “Consensus”.
While, so far, no joint statement has been identified following Prak Sokhonn’s visit to Naypydaw, analysts have identified a broad coverage of the event in the national state-run media, hinting that the visit might have been used by the Myanmar junta to stress their good relation with ASEAN.
The Cambodian authorities, state which holds the rotating Chairmanship of ASEAN, did not disclose the travel program of the Special Envoy, "to ensure the smooth running of the visit". According to non-state-owned Myanmar media, Sokhonn will also meet leaders of political parties; however, talks with representatives of ethnic minority armies have been reportedly cancelled.
The Myanmar-based opposition fighting the military junta has criticized Sokhonn's visit, arguing that it shows deference to military rulers and contempt for the will of the people. On March 21, a group called the “General Strike Coordination Body”, in a statement on behalf of 36 civil society and non-governmental organizations, said that ASEAN foreign ministers' recommendations at a meeting last month have been ignored by the Special Envoy, which in turn generated allegations that the ASEAN Special Envoymight be too lenient with the military regime. Following media reports, in Kalay, northwestern Myanmar, demonstrators challenged the security forces by organizing a small demonstration, allegedly hoisting signs saying that the Special Envoy was not welcomed in the country.
Upon his return to Cambodia, Prak Sokhonn declared that“It is clear that Myanmar's various political actors are not yet ready for talks, which is extremely difficult”. The Special Envoy further added that “After two days of discussions, hearings and exchanges of views, it is clear that the parties concerned remain committed to continuing to fight in all forms, especially with weapons. It means they still have the goal of defeating each other.”
Stressing the importance attached by ASEAN to resolving the Myanmar crisis, the Cambodian high official affirmed that “Finding the connection point means that we want to connect all the points that can lead to a solution for democratic change. It is the point that can bring back normalcy and bring Myanmar back to the ASEAN family with a full reputation.”
Certainly, the efforts of the ASEAN Special Envoy in the direction of solving the Myanmar crisis are not only commendable, but also a clear expression of ASEAN’s desire to maintain its cohesion by continuing to employ the “ASEAN Way” of consensualism. While a clear-cut solution – and, consequently, an ending – for the current crisis is yet to be envisaged, ASEAN has so far been the most involved regional organisation in solving the crisis, also as an expression of “ASEAN Centrality”.
The consequences of Myanmar close ties with Russia and China, as revealed on February 22, 2022, by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, might, however, be regarded by ASEAN as a possible nuisance to its Centrality in the region, in which case a harsher reaction might be expressed with regard to the military junta.
Following the coup d'état on February 1, 2021, the legislative, executive and judicial powers have been transferred to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Min Aung Hlaing, while General Myint Swe has been named interim president of the country. On the same day, leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent civil government figures, including President Win Myint, have been arrested. The Army attempted to justify its actions by denouncing the electoral fraud occurred during the elections of last November 8, whose results indicated a landslide victory, with 83% of the votes, for the National League for Democracy (NDL), the governing party prior to the coup.
In the aftermath of the coup, Myanmar has allegedly witnessed internal upheavals on several fronts. According to regional media, starting by February 6, 2021, a civil disobedience movement has been formed, resulting in multiple civil servants leaving their jobs. Allegedly, the protests of the population have been violently repressed by the military. The Army is described to have resumed fighting against various ethnic militias, accused to have approached the demonstrators, having provided them with military training. On April 16, 2021, further members of the Myanmar Parliament have been deposed. Consequently, certain leaders of the protests and other representatives of ethnic minorities in the country have established a National Unity Government (NUG), which, since May 5, 2021, has claimed to bolster an armed body, self-styled People's Defense Force. The NUG and its militias have been classified as a terrorist group by the self-proclaimed military government on May 8, 2021, which, to this date, has reportedly resulted in continuous violence across the country.
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The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy, position or view of IRSEA.